WATER POLITICS

Every year, rain and snow that falls in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan provides water for millions within their borders. Winter snow in the mountains melts in spring to fill hydropower reservoirs. Summer rain waters crops. But in 2025, precipitation fell short. Dramatically short. At about 80 percent of the 2000-2020 average, 2025 was one of the region’s driest years in decades. And drought could mean trouble ahead for a region enjoying a new level of cooperation.

The domestic impacts of such a dry year are difficult enough to endure. Kyrgyzstan’s Toktugul Dam and Tajikistan’s Nurek Dam are nearing historic lows for this time of year. To try to conserve water to generate power through the winter, both countries are implementing electricity demand restrictions to prevent total blackouts. 

But Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also have international worries. Come summer, downstream Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan will be wondering where their water is. As neighbors along the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers, these flat, arid countries depend on water from the lush headwaters of Central Asia to fill their irrigation canals to produce cotton and food. 

Figure 1: Rain falls in the lush mountainous ranges of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which form the headwaters of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers. These two rivers bring vital water into arid Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Map by Zachary Goodwin.

Water sharing between independent Central Asian nations has long been an uncomfortable affair. Hamstrung by Soviet-era infrastructure, border delineations, and agricultural decisions, the countries struggled to integrate newfound national goals and identities into their relations over water. 

At times, the situation turned violent. A clash between villagers on the Tajik and Kyrgyz sides of the shared Golovnoi water intake turned into a militarized conflict in April 2021, and it flared up again in September 2022. 

But since then, the tides have turned. Central Asian countries have found a new level of cooperation of late. Territorial disputes in the Fergana Valley have been resolved. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan agreed in late 2022 on shared management of the Andijan/Kempir-Abad Reservoir and a related land swap. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s March 2025 agreement to finally settle their nearly 1,000 km disputed border included a new sharing framework for the Golovnoi intake.

Long-time staunch opponents to planned large hydropower dams like the Rogun in Tajikistan and Kambarata-1 in Kyrgyzstan have softened their stance and even thrown political support behind the projects. 

Wary observers have noted that a trend toward authoritarian consolidation may have facilitated these new friendships. Current water scarcity may already be set to test them. 

Figure 2: Annual rainfall in from 2000 to 2020 in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan fluctuated around a mean of 830 mm. At 144 mm below that average, 2025 was the driest year in decades for the two countries that contribute the bulk of the water that flows into the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers. Data analysis by Dr. Erin Menzies-Pluer.

In September 2025, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan agreed to a “water-electricity swap:” Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would supply electricity to Kyrgyzstan over the winter so Kyrgyzstan could limit its hydropower production from the Toktogul Dam and store water for downstream irrigation in 2026. Only, thanks to dry conditions, Kyrgyzstan may already lack the required amount of water to keep that promise while keeping the lights on. And the seasonal forecast doesn’t suggest the much-needed water is coming any time soon.

Domestic concerns may compel Kyrgyzstan to prioritize domestic water demand. The country’s 2010 coup was fueled in part by anger over mismanagement of the Toktogul Reservoir. Officials at the time blamed a lack of water for blackouts in the dead of winter, only to have it revealed they were clandestinely selling electricity to neighboring countries. 

Present-day Kyrgyzstani officials started to manage expectations around winter electricity supply in September, warning citizens to brace for power cuts because of low water levels. Presidential calls to conserve energy in November apparently went unheeded.

Unsurprisingly, downstream neighbors were dismayed to learn of Kyrgyzstan’s water supply issues. Kazakhstan is already capping rice cultivation in anticipation of irrigation shortages.

Although Central Asian countries have agreed to water allocations from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers until October 2026, the weather may decide if there will be enough to go around. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need a very wet winter to fill reservoirs, but January was drier than normal. Forecasts show a similar dryness through May. 

And dry years aren’t about to go away. Climate projections suggest that average annual rainfall in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could increase slightly over the next 10-25 years, but that dry years like 2025 are still likely to occur. 

Human factors will also complicate how countries respond to a changing rainfall regime. Central Asia’s economies are evolving to include more technology and industrial processing, both of which will require more electricity and more water. As the Taliban finish the Qosh Tepa canal, Afghanistan will intercept an as-yet-unknown amount of water from the Amu Darya, preventing it from reaching Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan even if Tajikistan sends it downstream.

None of the above is enough to definitively predict conflict. After all, Central Asia has enjoyed relative peace since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. But water scarcity may test national and regional approaches to neighborly relations.

Are the new ties that bind Central Asian countries strong enough to weather drought? Only time will tell.