BLOG

WATER POLITICS

Via Future Directions International, a look at Turkey’s future water challenges:

Key Points

• Turkey is unlikely to experience widespread food or water insecurity in the years leading to 2030.
• Some urban areas could become water scarce by 2030 if demand for water is left unchecked and efficiency measures are not introduced.
• Increasing access to irrigation could increase cereal production and potentially increase exports.
• Water infrastructure projects, concentrated in the restive south-east of the country, could contribute to rising tensions with insurgent groups as well as Syria and Iraq.
• Political instability, both domestic and regional, poses the greatest risk to Turkish food and water security.

Summary

Turkey faces limited potential for widespread food and water insecurity between now and 2030. The actions that it takes over this time period, however, will have implications for the Kurdish minority living within its borders and the lower riparian countries of Syria and Iraq. Provided rising food and water demand – driven by population growth – is met, the greatest challenge to Turkish food and water security is likely to come from domestic and regional political instability.

 Analysis

The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers are of major strategic importance to the Mesopotamian region, comprising Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Turkey occupies the headwaters of these two important regional rivers. Its control over the region’s water supply shapes its political relations with these lower riparians.

Turkey’s control of the Tigris and Euphrates is further complicated by domestic political concerns relating to the Kurds. Large parts of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin lies within Kurdistan, an entity that Kurdish nationalists wish to establish as an independent Kurdish homeland.

Ankara has long recognised the hydropower and irrigation potential that could be derived from damming Turkish waterways. It began construction on the first dam on the Euphrates in the 1960s and since then it has built almost 600 dams with more than 200 still under construction. Developing this potential, however, could pose considerable socio-political challenges.

Demographic Change

Turkey’s population continues to grow at a rate of 1.3 per cent each year, slightly above the world average of 1.13 per cent. As a result, by 2030 the population is projected to have increased to 86.8 million people, from approximately 75 million today. In 2030, almost 60 per cent of its citizens are expected to live in urban areas. The concentration of people in cities could strain urban water supplies while population growth is likely to lead to greater demand for food and water resources throughout the country.

Migration from rural to urban areas is becoming increasingly common. Thousands of young people move into Istanbul and Ankara each year in search of employment. The eastern provinces are most affected by outward migration, since 1960 about one-third of the population has moved away. The south and south-east Anatolia region has high levels of unemployment, low industrialisation and is reliant on smallholder agriculture. Developing this part of the country could encourage people to stay or migrate and invest in agricultural production.

Turkey has become a major destination for refugees escaping regional conflict zones, mainly Syria and Iraq. At least 2.7 million Syrian refugees are estimated to have arrived in Turkey since the beginning of the conflict in 2011 and there could potentially be more as it is believed that a large number of them remain unregistered. If the refugee population increases rapidly, Turkey could begin to experience challenges in providing access to food and water. Some cities claim to have experienced a 30 per cent increase in population over a few years due to resettlement policies. The potential for social instability could rise if food and water resources are not closely managed, however, it is unlikely that refugees alone will weaken food and water security.

Water Security: Water Scarcity Possible by 2030

Rainfall is highly variable across the country, the central and south-eastern plateaus receive an average of 250mm per year while parts of the north-eastern Black Sea coast receive an average of over 2,000mm per annum. Overall, the country receives an average of 650mm each year.

A country or region is considered to be in a condition of water stress when the annual per capita water supply falls below 1,700 cubic metres. Once water availability drops below 1,000m³ per capita, the country or region is considered to be experiencing water scarcity.

Per capita water availability has declined to 1,600m³ in Turkey, suggesting that it is experiencing water stress. Some projections indicate that the situation is likely to continue to deteriorate, with water per capita availability expected to decline to 1,125m³ by 2023. If this projection proves accurate, it is possible that the country will become water scarce by 2030.

The majority of water, 71 per cent, is consumed by the agricultural sector, mainly to irrigate crops. Close to 90 per cent of irrigated areas employ highly wasteful surface irrigation methods. These methods lead to high rates of evaporation and surface runoff. Increasing the use of drip and sprinkler irrigation would reduce the amount of water wasted by the agricultural sector while maintaining crop production rates.

The industrial and domestic sectors each account for 14 per cent of the country’s water consumption. Domestic water use has increased from 98 litres per person per day in the 1980s to 250 litres per person per day currently. Turkey aims to save water by reducing daily consumption to 150 litres per person per day, the average amount used in the 1990s. Even with these measures, water used by irrigators and in domestic applications is estimated to double while the industrial sector is anticipated to triple the amount of water it consumes.

In recent years, highly populated areas, mainly Istanbul and the western and central provinces, have begun to experience water shortages in the summer months. As the population of these areas is projected to continue to increase it is possible that water shortages will become more acute. Simply building more storage facilities or rerouting water from elsewhere is unlikely to resolve the issue. Rerouting water invariably leads to water loss and, as the Istanbul Water and Sewerage Authority already relies on a network of ten dams, constructing more dams is unlikely to solve long-term water supply problems. Encouraging people to reduce unnecessary water use and introducing water recycling schemes in the heavily populated, but relatively water scarce, western and central provinces would provide a better solution to the region’s water issues.

As surface water sources come under strain from increased demand and lower inflow (mean rainfall is expected to decrease by five per cent by 2030) a larger portion of water will come from aquifers. Many groundwater sources are already overexploited and a proliferation of unauthorised or unregulated wells is leading to greater withdrawal rates. An increasing number of wells are becoming exhausted, leading to an increased risk of sinkholes and the shrinking or, in the worst case, depletion of groundwater recharge areas, such as lakes and rivers.

The South-eastern Anatolian Project (Güneydo?u Anadolu Projesi, GAP), initiated in the 1970s, is one of the largest river basin development projects in the world. It includes 13 irrigation and hydropower schemes, involving the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydropower plants on the Tigris and Euphrates. The project aims to further the development of the south-east and increase the level of agricultural production in the region while also reducing unemployment. The project, however, has been met with considerable challenges throughout its history and it is questionable how big an impact it will ultimately have.

Agriculture in Turkey

Various agricultural crops are planted throughout Turkey, although they are less common in the mountainous eastern regions, where animal husbandry is the main farming activity. Many farmers continue to practice traditional farming techniques and are generally reluctant to adopt new technologies. A large amount of agricultural land is held by small holders that typically have less than five hectares of land. Farms are relatively small and lack economies of scale. Output is low, as is the income of most farmers. Due to these factors, it is difficult to attract and retain agricultural workers.

In relation to the broader economy, the agricultural sector has diminished considerably since the 1980s when it accounted for a quarter of GDP and employed roughly half of the labour force. The food and agriculture sector now accounts fornine per cent of GDP and employs a quarter of the labour force. Turkey was one of the world’s few self-sufficient middle income countries until the 1980s when changes in domestic and agricultural policies increased its reliance on imports. Undeterred, it holds ambitions to be one of the world’s top five producers of agricultural goods by 2023.

Cereal crops are the largest agricultural commodity, by weight, grown in Turkey. Wheat, barley and maize, in that order, are the largest crops that it produces. While surplus wheat is exported, several million tonnes of the grain are imported each year, mainly from Russia. Most of this imported wheat is processed into flour, pasta and biscuits for sale on the international market. Provided Turkey maintains, and possibly even increases, food production and trade, it is unlikely to experience food insecurity in the years leading to 2030.

Access to Water: The Constraining Factor in Future Agricultural Development

Access to water is the main constraint in the future development of the agricultural sector. The central Anatolian Plateau, where most of the country’s farmland is located, receives less rainfall than coastal areas. The amount and time of rains varies considerably from year to year, leading to fluctuations in harvests. A sharp decline in production in 2007, for instance, coincided with severe drought conditions. Ensuring that water is readily available would assist in maintaining stable crop production. Expanding irrigation networks will reduce the level of variation as it would stabilise access to water and reduce the region’s dependence on rainfall.

 high dependence on seasonal rainfall has clearly led to volatile production. The GAP aims to increase the proportion of land under irrigation as well as expand and stabilise crop yield. Projections suggest that the GAP could bring an additional two million hectares of land under irrigation, which, if properly managed, could be enough to secure Turkey as a net exporter of agricultural goods.

Challenges to the GAP

The south-east portion of the country is the most underdeveloped part of the country. It is hoped that the construction of the GAP will bring industry and employment to the region and, in doing so, relieve the long-standing tensions that have plagued the region. The largest non-Turkish ethnic group, the Kurds, are concentrated in the south-east. Due to the size of the Kurdish population it is seen as the only minority group that could threaten the unity of the state. The Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan, PKK), an active separatist movement, has been active in the south-east since 1984 and continues to conduct a low-level insurgency in the area. If the area is developed it could pay significant dividends for the country, however, due to regional tensions, development projects will not be easily implemented.

Turkey’s Kurdish population make up 90 per cent of the population living in the area affected by the GAP. Many of them fear that the project is a government attempt to weaken ambitions for independent statehood. The construction of controversial infrastructure, such as the Ilisu Dam, that will destroy sites of importance to the Kurds is seen as an attempt to erase the group’s cultural history. Further south, Syria and Iraq are concerned that Turkish water projects could lower their share of water and negatively affect their own food and water security.

The PKK has conducted attacks against dam projects in Turkey’s south-east. Damage to the Ilisu Dam in 2015 is believed to have set the project back by two years and construction is now expected to be finished in 2017. Members of the insurgent group commonly abduct construction workers, set fire to equipment and lay explosives along access roads. It is possible that the project will again be delayed unless an accord is reached with the combative element of the Kurdish population.

It is hoped that the GAP will assist in resolving the Kurdish issue. The government promises the project will create jobs in the region and foster closer social integration. Its detractors argue that it is unlikely to significantly improve conditions in the region as the project has focussed on irrigation and electricity production while avoiding the more difficult task of building community engagement. Given the level of hostility between the Turkish state and insurgent groups, it is unlikely that this engagement will be forthcoming.

Conclusion: Political Instability the Greatest Threat to Turkish Food and Water Security

Turkey is unlikely to experience food or water insecurity in the years leading to 2030. While urbanisation, population growth and increased demand for water could prove challenging, it is in a position to overcome these challenges provided that it reduces water use in urban areas and succeeds in implementing less wasteful agricultural practices. The development of the south-east could increase agricultural production in the region, but it is unlikely to relieve tensions with the Kurdish minority. The GAP could also weaken relations with Syria and Iraq. The volatile political situation of the south-east and the broader Middle East, therefore, is likely to be the greatest threat to Turkish food and water security between now and 2030.