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February 3rd, 2012
Via The International Water Law Project, a report on how Turkey’s contemplated “freeze†of its relations with the EU is related to the interrelated water issues toward its Euphrates co-riparians as well as toward Cyprus. As the article notes:
Turkey plays an increasingly important global role as a cultural and economic bridge between Western nations and Muslim-majority nations. Its role has the potential to grow as it has been in talks to accede to the European Union (“EUâ€) since 2005. However, Reuters recently reported that Turkish officials have stated that Turkey would “freeze†relations with the EU if the EU were to grant its presidency to Cyprus (see Reuter’s article here). Cyprus is scheduled to take on the six-month rotating EU presidency in July 2012.
Turkey’s opposition to Cyprus’ EU presidency stems from several factors, including the potential conflict over Cyprus’s off-shore oil and gas drilling by Cyprus that is opposed by Turkey. But most fundamentally, Turkey is the only nation that currently recognizes the independent status of Northern Cyprus, with its majority ethnic Turk population, as compared to the rest of the majority ethnic Greek government of Cyprus. Turkey’s 1974 intervention (or invasion, depending on your perspective) in Northern Cyprus, Turkey’s recognition of Northern Cyprus as an independent states, and the EU’s blockade of Northern Cyprus have been the more stubborn obstacles to Turkey’s accession to the EU.
What does all of this have to do with water? The island of Cyprus has been suffering from a prolonged drought, impacting both agricultural and copper production, and further straining relations between North and South (see BBC article here).
Turkey has discussed construction of additional dams and reservoir capacity on the already contentious Euphrates River (which Turkey shares with co-riparians Syria and Iraq, as well as ethnic Kurds in all three countries, with each group suffering from drought as well). The proposed additional storage capacity on the Euphrates would not go to provide water to Turkey or its Euphrates co-riparians, but instead would supply Northern Cyprus via an undersea pipeline (see Global Post article here, and Green Prophet article here).
According to the Famagusta Gazette, Turkey began construction of the new reservoir and the undersea pipeline in March of 2011. The Turkish government contemplates 4 stages of construction for the project, with a projected completion date in March of 2014 (see article here).
Interestingly, this is not Turkey’s first foray into bulk water transports via pipeline into politically-contested territories. Turkey has previously proposed a “peace pipeline†to provide water to states in the Middle East, including Israel (see prior IWLP post on this topic here).This type of bulk water transport has very few precedents in international water policy. Singapore has, since the 1920s, purchased water in bulk from Malaysia (see here). Bulk water transport has been contemplated between the Canada and arid regions of the United States. However, environmental concerns over interbasin transfers and controversy over international trade and investment law, including NAFTA Chapter 11 protection for investors in bulk water transport projects, ended the contemplated transfer.
Turkey’s storage and pipeline project for the benefit of Turkish Cypriots has several implications for international water law and the hydropolitics of the region. First, other than the issue of Northern Cyprus, one of the other main obstacles to Turkey’s accession to the EU has been its relations with Syria and Iraq with respect to the Euphrates, and its treatment of ethnic Kurds within the Euphrates basin (see BBC article here).
Turkey’s relations with its co-riparians would arguably not comply with the EU Water Framework Directive (“WFDâ€). The WFD requires that EU member states work with co-riparian states in projects on transboundary rivers, and that requirement is not limited to coordination only with organized states, but also arguably with non-state actors, such as the Kurds. Additional storage on the Euphrates and an international bulk exportation of water from the basin will only further exacerbate relations between Turkey, Iraq, and Kurdistan, and aggravate an already imposing obstacle to Turkey’s accession to the EU.
Turkey’s failure to coordinate with its Euphrates co-riparians with regards to this project raises questions of international law and the widely accepted customary international law principle of “good neighborliness†requiring cooperation and information sharing for projects impacting shared fresh water resources. While there is no current treaty framework governing the Euphrates, the Turkish/Syrian Mixed Economic Commission and the Trilateral Water Institute/Joint Technical Committee can provide a foundation upon which to build a collaborative institution facilitating information sharing and cooperation between Euphrates riparians. Participation of Iraqi, Syrian, and Kurdish riparians in any bulk water export would at least avoid the legal and diplomatic problems arising from the contemplated storage and pipeline project for Northern Cyprus.
Furthermore, Turkey’s contemplated pipeline project raises questions of international trade in bulk water, not dissimilar to the issues that confronted the contemplated bulk water transport from Canada to the Southwestern United States. For example, the Greek Cypriot government could throw up legal trade barriers to prevent Turkey from selling water to Northern Cyprus. Such trade barriers could run afoul of the World Trade Organization laws, such as the 1994 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, respecting the “equal footing†status of trade partners as compared to domestic vendors. However, the status of bulk water transported via pipeline as a “commodity†subject to WTO regulations is not settled law, and the unique relations of the Greek Cypriot government toward Turkey, as well as the dire drought conditions in Cyprus, make this case more complicated than simply discriminatory tariffs.
Turkey could avoid these issues and facilitate its accession to the EU in several ways. First, Turkey could build upon those existing river basin institutions on the Euphrates by including Iraq and Kurdish representatives in an effort to comply with the WFD in the implementation of the reservoir and pipeline project. Second, Turkey could investigate the potential cost savings and water production capacity of desalination in Northern Cyprus as compared to the reservoir and pipeline project; if cost-feasible, desalination could provide a less controversial alternative to addressing the drought in Northern Cyprus. Third, while Turkey is unlikely to withdraw support in the near future for a Turkish Cypriot state, Turkey could recognize that it would have a great ability to address the interests of Turkish Cypriots as a member of the EU than under the status quo. Turkey’s efforts to alleviate the drought in Cyprus on a nondiscriminatory basis for the benefit of all Cyprus, whether through desalination or the reservoir/pipeline project, could be viewed as an olive branch to Greek Cypriot government. Such a diplomatic gesture could facilitate Turkey joining the EU despite support for an independent Northern Cyprus.
Turkey’s contemplated “freeze†of its relations with the EU fray what had been a strengthening tie between East and West. How Turkey resolves the interrelated water issues toward its Euphrates co-riparians as well as toward Cyprus could go a long way in either restoring or further weakening its role as an important cultural and economic bridge.
