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WATER POLITICS

Courtesy of STRATFOR (subscription required), some additional analysis on the recent Mekong River summit to discuss the health of the Mekong River and the possibility that China may have to do more to ease these water tensions in order to prevent other international players from undermining its influence in the region.  As the article notes:

“…Leaders from Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam — states that constitute the membership of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) — began the commission’s first summit April 2 at the Thai resort of Hua Hin. China and Myanmar will join the conference as observer members. Despite being a regional conference, the summit has generated a good deal of international attention given the ongoing drought in southwestern China and lower Mekong basin countries that began in late 2009. Since then, China has been accused of contributing to the river’s historically low water level with dam construction along the upper Mekong.

Responding to the criticism, Beijing has invited MRC representatives to oversee the construction of one dam and has offered to provide water-level data on two dams, but concern lingers over China’s growing economic and political clout in the region.

The Mekong River has a great impact on the ecology and livelihood of people living on the Indochinese peninsula. The river runs 2,700 miles from its headwaters on the Tibetan plateau through Yunnan province in China to Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, feeding the rich agricultural land in the lower basin (primarily Vietnam’s Mekong Delta “rice bowl”). Beginning in September 2009, severe drought in the region brought the Mekong River to its lowest level in nearly 20 years, causing a water shortage and affecting transportation and agriculture in MRC countries.

The drought has focused attention on hydroelectric projects that China has built on the Lancang River (the upper Mekong) in Yunnan province in the last 15 years. Four dams have been completed — Manwan (1996), Dachaoshan (2003), Gongguoqiao (2008) and Jinghong (2010) — while another four currently are under construction or planned. Environmental activists have long blamed the dams for causing the water level to fluctuate in lower Mekong countries, thereby affecting the entire ecology of the lower basin. As the drought has worsened, and without direct evidence of other factors contributing to the lower water levels, the debate over the Chinese dams has intensified.

On March 8, Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva called for China to help determine if Chinese construction of the dams has contributed to the drought downstream and requested Beijing to share water level data. Meanwhile, a senior official from Laos publicly accused Chinese dam operators of contributing to the low level of the Mekong River by retaining water for irrigation and electricity generation. Beijing has repeatedly denied the accusations, claiming China contributes less than 14 percent of the total volume of water in the Mekong River and pointing out that the severe drought has ravaged southwestern China as well.

Other MRC members, such as Chinese ally Cambodia, largely echoed Beijing’s denial of the accusations. MRC executive director Jeremy Bird, of the United Kingdom, also said the water shortage is largely a result of an early end to the 2009 rainy season and less rainfall during the past monsoon season, not China’s upstream dams.

Despite these denials, China has made some conciliatory gestures in an effort to maintain an image of benevolence in the region, something it has been trying to do for years. On March 25, Beijing agreed to provide water level data every week on the Jinghong and Manwan dams until the drought ends and invited MRC representatives to visit Jinhong.

These gestures, along with the expectation of the beginning of seasonal rains in May, have temporarily toned down the controversy, at least on the diplomatic level. But the issue of China’s water usage and growing economic and political influence in the region is far from resolved. And other international players well beyond the region may become increasingly involved, which would further challenge Beijing’s position in the region.

In fact, as early as 2004, the U.S. Pentagon released a report suggesting water disputes could lead to regional conflicts. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which met in early February, also called for a close examination of the impact of Chinese dams on lower Mekong-basin countries. And a recent, high-level meeting between U.S. diplomats and MRC representatives in Laos in late March, in which the United States offered aid to MRC-member states, reflected a U.S. attempt to use the water issue to curb China’s growing regional influence. Although Washington’s announced “re-engaging Asia” policy initiative has yet to gain much traction, such gradual U.S. steps into Asian affairs could well prompt China to become even more conciliatory in order to expand and consolidate its regional influence.

Japan is another international player ready to reassert its influence in the Mekong River region. On March 31, two days ahead of the MRC summit, senior government officials from MRC countries and Japan met in Hanoi, Vietnam, to discuss the sustainability of the Mekong River and how best to manage it as a critical source of water in southeast Asia.

As STRATFOR has noted, Southeast Asia is an arena of increasing international competition, mainly between China and the United States. It is also an area that relies heavily on Chinese economic investment, and following China’s conciliatory moves, Mekong region countries may be less inclined to blame China for their water problems. But more powerful international players may be waiting in the wings.