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The Thirsty Dragon: China’s “One Belt, One Road” Project and Implications of Central Asia’s Water Crisis

Via Global Water Forum, a look at the implications of Central Asia’s water crisis on China’s Belt-and-Road initiative:

On May 2017, 29 heads of state gathered in Beijing to discuss the “One Belt, One Road” project, an ambitious economic and diplomatic initiative designed to connect China with the world. Although the initiative promises to stimulate economic growth beyond Asia, Kerry Brown, a former diplomat who is now Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at King’s College, London, fears that significant water resource constraints in Central Asia could undermine the Chinese initiative.

In this GWF Q&A, Prof. Kerry Brown talks with GWF’s Senior Editor, Jesper Svensson, about what is driving China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative and what it means for the economy and the environment in China and Central Asia.

A map of the “One Belt, One Road” project. 

Ed: For people not familiar with the “One Belt, One Road” project, what exactly is this initiative and what is China trying to achieve with the “One Belt, One Road” project?
Kerry Brown: The One Belt, One Road project involves the development of a maritime and a land road designed to increase trade opportunities between approximately 60 countries within the Eurasia region. The basic idea is, between these 60 countries, some kind of commonality will be developed which will provide mutual benefit to all.

However, there are several potential issues with the project. First, because the project is an initiative rather than a policy, it is rather abstract. What academics and policy makers outside of China do know with certainty is based on information cobbled together from different reports and papers. For instance, a White paper published two years ago called it the “Belt and Road Initiative” and talked about creating greater connectivity between China and other countries.

Second, for the Belt and Road Initiative to be successful, it must move beyond rhetoric, whilst avoiding the creation of asymmetric benefit streams. In other words, it must avoid delivering deals, which are in China’s interests but not in those of others. Both of these objectives present a significant challenge for the project.

Finally, the land part of the “Belt and Road Initiative” is linked to the development of China’s less developed western regions. This presents enormous environmental and ecological challenges. The “New Silk Road” currently focuses on economic outcomes and does not involve legal connectivities or environmental initiatives. For instance, despite the project proposing to connect with Central Asian countries, it does not involve any transboundary water cooperation frameworks. It is hard to see the project getting very far without creating formal transboundary frameworks.

Ed: Yet, Central Asia suffers from some of the most serious water and energy problems in the world. Northwestern China also faces serious water stress in a fragile environment. Will the fragile natural environment in this region be an obstacle for the implementation of the “One Belt, One Road” project?
Kerry Brown: China’s environmental problems are very serious. No one has any doubt about that. They have been serious for a long time. Some argue that even in the Han Dynasty two thousand years ago the territory partially covered by China now was starting to suffer from deforestation, and some of the early signs of climate change. Certainly intense industrialisation since the 1950s has had a massive impact on air and water quality, the costs of which China is bearing to this day.

For these reasons, the Central Chinese Government is very supportive of the Paris Convention and, in fact, after the election of Donald Trump and his skepticism about human-caused climate change, the Chinese Government has been very pro-active, saying it will stick by the Paris Convention and implement it.

Faced with the challenge of water scarcity and pollution, the Chinese Government has also begun to implement the ”Three Red Lines Policy”, which sets clear and binding limits on water usage, efficiency, and quality by 2030. But the success of this centrally formulated policy depends on its implementation by local governments.

As China extends its economic development from the arid Northwestern region to Central Asia, economic growth will result in greater water demand and potential pollution. The question is whether the ”Belt and Road Initiative” and the new Silk Road Economic Belt is going to help address these problems and what sort of attention and emphasis it will give to the associated environmental components.

Ed: In Asia, China shares 110 rivers and lakes with 18 countries. But most of China’s transboundary river basins are not covered by treaties and have few institutional mechanisms in place. Do you think the large number of domestic actors involved in water management in China and their overlapping responsibilities and interest hinders China’s efforts to effectively cooperate with downstream states?
Kerry Brown: China’s water supply is a politically complex issue. Several of its major rivers are shared with countries it has border-disputes with, such as India. It is therefore in China’s interest to have robust treaties with downstream countries, but it is not keen on signing any binding treaties because of the philosophical disposition of the Chinese government. The Communist Party of China, dislikes cramping its geopolitical space and flexibility by entering agreements that bind its hands and ties it down. That is unlikely to change.

China is often happy to abide by international rules when it feels it has been listened to throughout the rules’ development. However, the country still prioritises its on its own needs first and foremost. In that sense, it has been called a self-interested, rather than altruistic actor.

In the environmental and water space, there are profoundly practical reasons why China would want to abide by international treaties, like the Paris Agreement, but it has to balance the large demands of its aspiring middle class with the longer-term needs of preserving water and its environment and international obligations. This is the sort of tightrope other nations also try to walk along. The only difference is that China’s space for mistakes and discretion is much smaller.

Professor Kerry Brown at King’s College says that the world needs to work out quickly the collective attitude of the new government in Beijing after the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. 

Ed: Next autumn in 2017, the Communist Party of China will host the 19th Party Congress. You have said in an article for The Diplomat that this will be “the world’s most complex game of political chess”. What do you mean by that and how could it affect water policy and governance in China and internationally?
Kerry Brown: The current five-year programme, which runs from 2016 to 2020, has a lot on combating climate change, preserving water resources, dealing with water pollution, and creating better conditions for sustainable growth. The political commitment is there but the Party is going through a huge leadership transition and the Party puts a premium on leadership. Although most Chinese officials at any level would support sustainability and don’t want to “muck” around with China’s water supply, they are under enormous pressure to create new sources of economic growth.

In addition, the State and the Party needs to balance two competing demands: the need for fast growth, and sustainability. After the 19th Party Congress new leadership will emerge at the lower levels of the Party and the Government, probably focused on the delivery of the many promises that have been made under Xi Jinping since 2012 when he was elevated to leadership. In any political context, making promises and then failing to keep them can be damaging, with or without elections. It is likely that the political narrative from late 2017 because of leadership changes and the tightening of political space in China, and the drive towards achieving the centennial goal in 2021 of creating a middle-income country will be paramount. The Party must be responsive to this.

What the rest of the world needs to work out quickly in this context of domestic change and leadership development is the collective attitude of the new government and its personnel at all levels towards combating their environment and sustainability issues and the ways they want to work with the world to do this. It is likely that the Party and the Government will be cooperative because it is in their interest to be cooperative – it is just a question of how much they are prepared to work with the outside world, and how the world would best like to work with them.



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