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The Thirsty Dragon: China Seeks To Build Rapport Downstream

Via Future Directions International, a report on China’s recent release of water from some of its Mekong dams:

Much of South-East Asia is experiencing exceptionally dry conditions. For parts of the region, the dry season typically runs between January and September and it is not unusual for there to be lower water availability. The current level of water scarcity in the region, however, is unusual. Vietnam, for instance, is reportedly in the midst of its most severe drought in 90 years. Thailand has also almost completely exhausted many of its dams and is beginning to utilise “dead storage” (the water left at the bottom of reservoirs that is not normally used). These conditions have put pressure on regional water systems and heightened concerns about future regional water security. China, while not outwardly recognising that its dam building activities could be blamed for exacerbating the situation, has released water from one of its dams.

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The Mekong River, known as the Lancang in China, has its headwaters in the Tibetan Plateau and flows through China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia before draining into the South China Sea in Vietnam. China has built six dams on it with plans for another 14 in the pipeline.

Mekong RiverBeijing claims that its dams do not negatively impact the flow of the river. Instead, it argues the dams benefit the region as they regulate water flow to prevent floods and relieve droughts. Following a request from Hanoi, China increased the amount of water flowing out of its Jinghong Dam on 15 March. It has promised to continue to do so until the end of the “low water period” to relieve the pressures of the regional drought. As Laos and Cambodia are set to build their own dams on the Mekong it is not just Beijing that Hanoi will need to approach to relieve future droughts.

The gesture was ostensibly timed to coincide with the inaugural Lancang-Mekong Co-operation (LMC) summit. The LMC could either compete or complement the Mekong River Commission, an established regional grouping that includes China as a “dialogue partner”. Either way, the LMC was established to build Chinese influence in the region and allow it greater say in the development of the Mekong River Basin. Releasing water from Jinghong was evidently a means to build early rapport with member states, particularly as relationships are increasingly strained by events elsewhere, whether or not this goodwill continues remains to be seen.

Upstream water transfers pose considerable problems for Vietnam, which is the furthest from the Jinghong Dam and likely to receive the lowest amount of water. Tran Duc Cuong, a spokesperson from the Mekong River Commission, estimates that just 27 to 54 per cent of discharged water will reach the country. Most of Vietnam’s rice production is based in the parched Mekong Delta region. If the drought continues, the beginning of the cropping season could be postponed, lowering the amount of rice that can be produced. The water shortage, however, is not yet serious enough to challenge its status as the world’s third-largest rice producer.

Increasing salinity could also damage the country’s rice industry. Saltwater intrusion is not unusual. Water levels are always low in the Mekong during the first few months of the year as snowmelt in Tibet diminishes and monsoon rains are yet to set in. This season, however, water levels in the Lower Mekong were reportedly lower than any year since record-keeping began almost a century ago. The low levels caused salt water intrusion to begin two months earlier and 25 kilometres further inland than usual. Chinese media sources have announced that the release of water from Jinghong Dam has helped to push saltwater back by six to ten kilometres.

Regional concerns about the impacts of dam construction are likely to grow. Beijing has announced, in its latest five-year plan, that it will be constructing more hydropower and infrastructure projects in Tibet and Yunnan Province. It does not state which rivers it is likely to construct these projects on, but it is likely that the Yarlung Zangbo (Brahmaputra), Lancang (Mekong) and Nu (Salween) will be contenders. It has been suggested that by 2030, between 77 and 136 dams could be operating on the Mekong. This number is probably exaggerated, as the point of diminished returns is likely to have been reached long before this many have been constructed. Regional worries will continue to grow nonetheless.

By releasing water from Jinghong Dam, during an exceptionally severe dry season, Beijing is seeking to alleviate regional fears surrounding its dam building activities. By releasing water it is indicating that it has the power to increase water flow downstream, this is the closest the region is likely to get to an admission that Chinese dam construction has altered the flow of rivers. Without an equal platform upon which to debate the issue, however, regional states are likely to continue to be sidelined.



This entry was posted on Wednesday, April 13th, 2016 at 10:02 am and is filed under Cambodia, China, Laos, Mekong River, Thailand, Vietnam.  You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed.  Both comments and pings are currently closed. 

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