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WATER POLITICS

Via Future Directions International, commentary on China’s recent decision to resume sharing river flow data with India:

On 15 May, China resumed providing India with data on the flow of the Brahmaputra River, after ceasing to do so in 2017. The data is vital for flood planning in India and downstream Bangladesh during the monsoon season.

The resumption of data sharing is a positive step in the normalisation of the Sino-Indian relationship. The disruption in data sharing exposed the flaws of governing transboundary water sources through bilateral agreements. Points of contention, such as the Doklam standoff, are apt to spill over into water sharing agreements and prevent the effective governance of the water sources.

Comment

The Brahmaputra River severely floods areas of north-east India and Bangladesh during the annual monsoon season, causing huge losses of life and property. In an effort to minimise the damage caused by flooding, China and India signed an agreement in 2013 to share hydrological data during the flood season from 15 May to 15 October.

The cancellation of data sharing in 2017 caused considerable concern in India, as it was seen as a result of the 73-day border standoff on the Doklam Plateau. China insists that the failure to provide data was due to technical reasons, but as China continued to share data for the same river with Bangladesh, that seems implausible.

This data is crucial, as it helps India predict the likelihood of flooding in the north-east and prepare for it. The absence of flood-season data in 2017, reduced India’s ability to make adequate preparations for flood-like situations, creating havoc in the state of Assam, where hundreds of people were killed or displaced.

China’s decision to resume providing India with the Brahmaputra’s water data will improve India’s preparation for flood situations. It is also an attempt to build trust between the two countries post-Doklam.

This rapprochement has failed to calm Indian suspicions, however. Many in India still believe that China is using several of its hydroelectric dams to divert or store water, which could potentially cause floods downstream if they released a large amount of water. These suspicions could be dispelled if China were to periodically release data on how these dams are being utilised.

The building of trust between India and China is important for future water resource co-operation, as successful water management depends largely on mutual trust and understanding. The sharing of data is an important component of the Sino-Indian relationship, but the Doklam standoff last year showed how volatile that relationship is and how political discord can threaten Indian water security.

There is presently little hope for further co-operation on water issues through bilateral exchanges or through the creation of a transnational water management body. Li Zhifei, an assistant research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies, argues that co-operation on transboundary rivers will not go further than an exchange of data until border disputes are resolved. He considers that any developments that take place regarding transboundary rivers, will inevitably run into issues relating to sovereignty.

The establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Co-operation framework could indicate a Chinese willingness to engage in multilateral water governance arrangements. If India were to promote a multilateral institutionalised water management body, with the support of Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, then together these nations could pressure China to join a basin-wide mechanism to govern South Asian water resources.

India has an important role to play in the creation of such a mechanism. Like China, India has strained relations with its neighbours over water resources. In Nepal, there is a strong feeling among the populace that Nepal’s rich water resources have been constantly exploited by India. Conversely, Bangladesh is concerned about Indian dams restricting water flows downstream and the possibility of flooding due to the rapid release of excess water by India.

If India wishes to address its concerns regarding China infringing on its water rights, then it may need to change its hegemonic behaviour towards its neighbours. The support of Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan is crucial, if India and China are to negotiate a framework for greater co-operation on shared water resources.

China’s decision to resume sharing river flow data with India is an important step in normalising Sino-Indian relations, but it does not necessarily promise greater water co-operation in the future. The pre-existing tensions that contributed to the Doklam standoff still exist. Importantly, there is currently no dialogue to replace the bilateral arrangement, under which China was able to stop sharing data, with an institutional framework capable of fostering greater co-operation.