BLOG

WATER POLITICS

Via The International Water Law Project, a detailed look at the hydropolitical issues that may arise in East Africa with the emergence of South Sudan:

On January 9, 2011, and for the next six days, the people of South Sudan exercised their right of self determination and voted overwhelmingly to secede from the Sudan and establish their own independent state. The right of self determination was the major outcome of the negotiations process between the Sudan government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) which represent the people of South Sudan.  The official results of the referendum were announced on February 7, 2011, and the government of the Sudan formally accepted of the results of the referendum on that day. The new state of South Sudan will formally come into existence on July 9, 2011, following the end of the interim period on July 8, as the 193rd member of the global family of nations, and as the 54th African state. As a result, the Sudan will lose, among many other things, one of its main defining characteristics as the largest country in Africa.

The Southern Sudan Referendum Act that was adopted in December 2009, listed a number of issues that need to be resolved by the two parties. Among other issues, these include: nationality; currency; public service; position of joint integrated units; international agreements and treaties; debts and assets; oil fields, production and transport; oil contracts; water resources; and property. These issues are in addition to disputes on a number of border areas between Northern and Southern Sudan (which extend for more than 2.000 kilometers), as well as the Abyei dispute that was adjudicated before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), but still remains unresolved (see Dr. Salman’s article on the Abyei Territorial Dispute).

Thus, water resources are one of the more contentious area between the Sudan and the new state of South Sudan.  There are three issues involved and need resolution in this area:

• First: reallocation between the two states of the 18.5 Billion cubic meters of water allotted to the Sudan under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Sudan and Egypt. The demands of the Sudan and South Sudan are expected to be far more than the 18.5 billion. Sudan will lose  50% of the revenues of oil of Southern Sudan that it was getting during the interim period as per the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed between Sudan and SPLM/A in 2005. As a result, Sudan would have to rely more heavily on irrigated agriculture to make up for the lost revenues from South Sudan oil. On the other hand, South Sudan is claiming that it has a good number of irrigation, water supply, and hydro-power projects that would need large amounts of Nile waters too. Thus, negotiations on this issue are not expected to be easy.
• Second: The huge swamps of Southern Sudan, including the Sudd, where water losses are tremendous, are viewed by both Egypt and Sudan as a source for additional waters to the Nile. This additional water would be in the range of 20 billion cubic meters for the Nile, almost one fourth of the total amount of the Nile flow of 84 billion cubic meters measured at Aswan. The aborted experience of the Jonglei canal is a clear indication of the difficult issues surrounding the conservation of the waters of the swamps of Southern Sudan for adding more water to the Nile (see Dr. Salman’s article on Water Resources in the Sudan North-South Peace Process).  Whether South Sudan would be willing to allow construction of any such canal would depend on a host of factors including the incentives it may receive, the views and positions of the affected communities and NGOs, and the security situation in the swamps areas. The other Nile riparian countries may well have their views on the matter and may ask to be part of the process. After all, the question may be posed as to whose water is it any way?
• Third: The new state of South Sudan is expected to have a major role to play in the current Nile dispute. The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) has been a divisive issue. Sudan and Egypt have vehemently opposed it, while the other Nile riparian states are pushing for its adoption and entry into force. Thus far six countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi), out of the Nile ten riparian countries have signed the CFA. It needs six instruments of ratification to enter into force, but thus far none of the six states has ratified the CFA. Thus, if South Sudan joins as a party to the CFA, it would provide a cushion in case one of the other six changes its mind or delays its ratification. Whether South Sudan would side with the equatorial states based on ethnicity, geography and history, or would be wooed by Sudan and Egypt to refrain from joining the CFA remains to be seen.

The centrality of water resources in the issues that must be addressed in post-conflict situations has been reconfirmed by the emergence of South Sudan as an independent nation. In this case, the issues go well beyond the Sudan and the new state of South Sudan, and extend to the other riparian states of the Nile Basin.