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WATER POLITICS

Via Future Directions International, a look at Iraq’s water crisis:

Key Points

• Iraq depends on surface water from the Tigris-Euphrates river system for almost all of its water and increased groundwater exploitation over the past decade could exhaust aquifers by 2030.
• Infrastructural damage, sustained after decades of government mismanagement, neglect and war, will continue to hinder water security and domestic food production between now and 2030.
• Water availability is likely to decline as a result of population growth, the development of water infrastructure in upper riparian states and climate change.
• Increased salinisation, soil degradation and lower rainfall will also prevent Iraq from achieving the government’s food self-sufficiency goal.

 Summary

Iraq is beset by many security challenges, including political dysfunction, poor governance, corruption, sectarianism and jihadism. While these immediate challenges undoubtedly pose considerable risk to the viability and stability of the state, rising food and water insecurity are less apparent, but no less worrying, security challenges. Pressure from population growth, a continued lack of sufficient infrastructure, riverine development projects in upper riparian states and climate change is likely to reduce the level of Iraqi food and water security by 2030.

Analysis

As the majority of Iraq is desert, food and water security is naturally tenuous. Rainfall is sparse across the country averaging a meagre 216mm per year. Parts of the north-east receive an average of 1,200mm per year while 60 per cent of the south receives less than 100mm. The country is therefore heavily reliant on water that flows from outside its borders.

Areas capable of sustaining large settlements draw water from two transboundary rivers, the Tigris, which flows over the Turkish border into Iraq, and the Euphrates, which begins in Turkey and flows through Syria before entering Iraq. Together the Tigris and Euphrates rivers provide Iraq with 98 per cent of its surface water.

A number of smaller rivers join the Tigris in the east. With the exception of the Al-Adhaim, which is an intermittent rain-fed river located entirely in Iraq, these tributaries are also shared with Turkey or Iran. Iraq is therefore highly dependent on water flows from neighbouring, upper riparian states.

Domestic volatility also impacts food and water security within Iraq. Since June 2014, the Islamic State (IS) has taken control of territory and water infrastructure in the north of the country. Most of Iraq’s water and arable land is located in this part of the country. According to Ghazi al-Abboudi, the Iraqi Agriculture Minister, 40 per cent of Iraq’s agricultural production capacity was captured by IS in 2014. While IS has lost control of roughly half the territory it controlled at its peak in Iraq, this came at considerable cost to the country’s infrastructure. Liberating parts of Salah al-Din and Al-Anbar cost an estimated US$25 billion ($32.4 billion) in damage to infrastructure, the local economy and private property. Local authorities in Al-Anbar and Diyala provinces have estimated that 80 per cent of essential services, including the electricity, health, water and education sectors, are damaged. Since these estimates were released in April, IS forces have been pushed out of Ramadi, withconsiderable damage to infrastructure as a result of explosives laid by IS, airstrikes by the US-led coalition and the scorched-earth policy enacted by retreating IS forces. Reconstruction will take time and considerable amounts of financial capital.

Reconstruction is yet to commence and will take years, as well as considerable funds, to complete. In March 2016, the government set up a 500 billion dinar ($547 million) reconstruction fund that focusses on the provision of water, electricity, food, shelter, health and education in the short-term and the rebuilding of infrastructure in the long-term. Iraq clearly lacks the financial capital and effective governance to rebuild the country, without international assistance it will struggle to contain the discontent that could contribute to anti-state movements.

Southern Iraq has avoided the destruction brought about by IS, however, it too faces developmental challenges that will prove difficult to overcome. The region once had an irrigation system that provided water to groves of date palms. The agricultural sector in the south has faced considerable challenges as years of war, increased salt water intrusion and the expansion of oil exploration has pushed farmers off their land. Those involved in the agricultural sector in the south of the country are generally poorer and less productive than those in the north.

The scale of the destruction brought about by decades of government mismanagement, neglect and war, along with the ineffectual political system, suggests that Iraq will struggle to overcome the high levels of food and water insecurity that have developed over the course of decades.

Changing Demographics Contributing to Rising Demand

Rising demand, brought about by a growing population, also threatens to increase food and water insecurity in Iraq. After growing by more than three per cent per annum since 2010, the population reached 36.4 million in 2015. While conflict and displacement could reduce the rate of population growth, current projections suggest that by 2030, the population is expected to rise to 44 million.

Increased pressure on water resources could contribute to an increased migration rate, with most potential migrants likely to move from rural to urban areas. Difficulties in obtaining water for agriculture will drive this movement of people. Iraqi society is already highly urbanised with 70 per cent of the population living in urban areas in 2015. In recent years, farmers have abandoned their land due to conflict, drought and lack of government support. This trend is likely to continue, placing further strain on agricultural productivity, food security and the water infrastructure of urban Iraq.

Declining Water Availability Likely to Undermine Food Production

While Iraqis blame upper riparians for their water woes, their water insecurity is heightened by both internal and external factors. Decades of mismanagement, inadequate maintenance of water infrastructure, drought and conflict combined to weaken domestic water security. Diversion canals that were constructed decades ago to provide water for irrigators are generally in a parlous state of disrepair, leading to considerable loss and waste. The construction of dams and other water diversion projects in Turkey and Syria also reduce the amount of water available in Iraq. As a result of these domestic and foreign factors, along with population growth and increased demand, water availability declined from 5,900 cubic metres in 1977 to 2,400 cubic metres in 2009.

Mismanagement of water within Iraq has contributed to current levels of water insecurity. Irrigators do not use efficient irrigation systems and instead flood their fields with water. As a result of flood irrigation methods, fertilisers and high concentrations of other, potentially toxic, substances are washed into canals, waterways and rivers. Generally, Iraqi farmers are reluctant to adopt efficient irrigation methods due to the greater cost of such systems.

Like most of the region, Iraq suffered from a multiyear drought that began in 2007 and ended in 2010. Over these years, annual rainfall was 70 per cent lower than usual across the country and surface water supplies became scarce. During these drought years the government drilled about 1,000 groundwater wells in an effort to reduce the impact of surface water sources drying up. It is probable that landowners drilled their own private wells during this time, further stressing groundwater reserves. Between 2003 and 2009, the Tigris-Euphrates Basin lost 144 cubic kilometres of stored freshwater, an amount almost equal to the entire capacity of the Dead Sea. Most of the decline is believed to have been caused by an increase in the amount of groundwater withdrawn from aquifers. Estimates suggest that only 20 per cent of the original groundwater reserves remain and, with limited potential for them to be replenished, there is potential for them to be completely exhausted, potentially before 2030.

Iraq is also highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Average temperatures across the Middle East have risen over the past decade, a trend that is likely to continue. As a result of the changing climate, lower vegetation coverage, desertification and drought, sand- and dust-storms are likely to increase in frequency by 2030. These storms damage crops and contribute to soil loss and degradation by removing organic matter and topsoil. Droughts of a similar magnitude to that of 2007-10 are likely to become increasingly frequent, further threatening water security and domestic food production.

Turkish infrastructure projects, such as the Atatürk Dam, are believed to have reduced flows into Iraq by one-third and other projects, such as the Ilisu and Cizre dams, could reduce current flows by another 50 per cent. In the absence of a transboundary treaty, there is no obligation for either Turkey or Syria to guarantee a minimum amount of water for Iraq.

In 2009, the Iraqi parliament demanded a greater share of water from Turkey and Syria. It is unlikely that a water sharing agreement between the three countries that make up the Tigris-Euphrates will be forthcoming in the near future. While a regional water sharing agreement could go some way toward ameliorating Iraq’s water supply problems, it will also need to address the mismanagement and waste within its own borders if it is to ensure long-term water security.

Southern Iraq: An Endangered Agricultural Region

Southern Iraq has become the centre of agricultural production since IS seized considerable territory in the northern breadbasket and subsequently destroyed valuable agricultural infrastructure. The south, too, however, faces challenges that could undermine its ability to produce food.

The fertile soil at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers supported Marsh Arab, or Ma’dan, communities for centuries. In the early 1960s, the marshlands covered 20,000 square kilometres. Since the 1970s, due to various government-led development programmes, the marshlands have come under threat. Their existence was severely challenged when former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, drained more than 90 per cent of the marshes in the 1990s. The infrastructure that diverted water away from the marshes was largely destroyed after Saddam was removed from power, allowing for them to be restored to some extent.

After almost being restored, the marshes are again under threat. In 2006/07, the water level in the marshlands returned to about 75 per cent of its original levels. Less than three years later, severe drought and the storage of water behind dams upstream led to water levels declining to below 20 per cent.

As a result of declining flow rates at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab River, which forms at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates and flows into the Persian Gulf, water quality in southern Iraq has deteriorated considerably. Salinisation, caused by salt water intrusion from the Persian Gulf, is leading to soil degradation. For the first time in memory, saline water extended beyond Qurna where the Tigris and Euphrates meet. In the past, annual floods would wash away salt and deposit new silt and nutrients. A major flood has not been recorded in the region since 1968. In parts of the region, water salinity has increased from 300 to 500 parts per million (ppm) in the 1980s to 15,000 ppm. Fishing is a major agricultural activity in the region, and while fishers are still catching hundreds of tons of fish each day there are fears that overfishing will eventually threaten the industry.

Southern Iraq, arguably now Iraq’s main agricultural region after IS seized, and subsequently destroyed, the majority of the northern breadbasket, faces rising challenges from salinisation, lower water availability and soil degradation.

Economic Challenges Arising from Food and Water Insecurity

The Iraqi economy, overly dependent on oil production and wracked by years of conflict and mismanagement, is hardly robust. If Iraq fails to diversify its economy away from oil, it is likely to face continued budgetary pressures as it becomes increasingly dependent food imports.

Iraqi oil production is also threatened by limits on production that are expected to worsen unless efforts are taken to increase productive capacity. To overcome production bottlenecks in the oil-rich south, water needs to be injected into wells to maintain reservoir pressure and recovery rates. River water was used in the past but, given declining availability, alternatives are being developed. At a cost of US$4 to US$6 billion, the Common Seawater Supply Project aims to treat seawater from the Persian Gulf for use in southern oilfields, but it is not anticipated to be complete by 2018 at the earliest.

Rising food and water insecurity is expected to have negative ramifications for the Iraqi economy up to, and beyond, 2030.

Conclusion

Iraqi food and water insecurity is unlikely to improve by 2030. Population growth, continued political instability, an inability to repair infrastructure, environmental degradation and climate change threaten food and water security throughout the country. A basin-wide agreement that provides Iraq with enough water to meet its needs and flush the Shatt al-Arab River of salt water could go some way to improving its food and water security. Such an agreement is unlikely, however, given the intransigence of Turkey and the seemingly intractable political crises in Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, such an agreement would not resolve the internal water problems that undermine long-term food and water security. Until Iraq addresses its own, internal water mismanagement and waste, food and water security is likely to continue to prove elusive.