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WATER POLITICS

Via Future Directions International, a look at Iran’s water diplomacy with Afghanistan and the region:

Iranian history is marred by water related insecurities and conflicts. In recent years, water related issues are at the fore of the concerns of residents and politicians alike. In particular, Iran faces transboundary quarrels with Turkey, Afghanistan and the Kurdish people, which add to Iran’s significant domestic water scarcity challenges. Overcoming these issues will require serious political will as well as meaningful interstate co-operation.

Comment

Iran and Afghanistan have a number of shared water resources, namely the Helmand River originating in the Helmand province of Afghanistan. This has been a point of contention for decades and, despite spates of conflict, the two countries have generally managed to work through the sharing of this resource. Recently however, this river system is presenting the two countries with increasing challenges. Tehran claims that, by building the Kamal Khan dam, Kabul is ignoring a 1973 agreement that guaranteesIran a flow of 22 cubic metres a second annually. Simultaneously, Iran (as well as the Kurdish region and Iraq) faces the possibility of having the ever important water supply from the Euphrates and Tigris River systems greatly reduced. Turkey has undertaken a number of dam projects which could drastically reduce the downstream water supply.

There is also a more recent development regarding Iran’s diplomatic relations with the Kurdish population that mostly reside in the northern part of Iraq as well as part of the Iranian side of the border. On 25 September, the Iraqi Kurdish people plan to vote in a referendum for independence from the rest of Iraq.  Iran has already threatened to inhibit river flows to the Kurds if they push ahead with independence. In the broader context, it has been argued that this referendum could present opportunities for closer co-operation, however, this would indicate a break from past experience and independence, if it went ahead, could turn sour for Iran.

These important transboundary water governance grievances are also linked to Iran’s internal water insecurities and points of conflict. There have been several instances of violence where Iran has perceived a direct threat to its residents’ access to water close to the border. Villagers in the Kohsan district of Afghanistan, who largely live off the Hari Rud River, claim that Iranian border police have killed at least ten civilians who were seeking to obtain water from the river which runs along the border itself. Kabul has also accused Tehran of supplying the Taliban with the means to sabotage the reconstructionof the Salma Dam project which has the potential to reduce the flow into Iran by 71 per cent. Between 1998 and 2001 the Taliban, which formed the Afghan Government at the time, shut off the Helmand River at the Kajaki Dam, this caused mass environmental destruction and the mass migration of Iranian residents downstream.

Perhaps more troubling for Iran’s residents, is the vast array of internal challenges that the country is facing in securing their domestic water supply. Iran is increasingly water scarce and it is argued that this is largely due to rapid population growth and urbanisation that occurred since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, unsustainable agricultural practices and mismanaged and unsustainable water policies. Climate change compounds these issues as reduced rainfall results in increasingly depleted dams and underground water systems. Local media has reported multiple instances of violent clashes between residents throughout the country over water shortages, and it is believed that these occurrences will increase in number and intensity over the coming decades if these water grievances are not addressed.

Steps are being taken to improve the situation. Earlier this year, Iran’s sixth Five Year Development Plan, which lays out goals for all aspects of development, was enacted. Included in this plan are objectives to reduce water use and increase desalination production. Critics have argued, however, that too many proposals address the symptoms rather than the main drivers of Iran’s water scarcity. Tehran is, however, taking proactive steps to address its transboundary water issues. In the first half of the year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up the water diplomacy bureau and representatives of Tehran and Kabul have convened on at least two occasions regarding this issue. Iran will need to replicate such dialogue with Turkey to address the transboundary issues that exist with that country.

Iran has an exceedingly difficult path to ensure a sustainable water secure future. Violent clashes and cross border skirmishes between civilians, and governmental personnel are likely to continue as mitigation and adaptation policies take time to implement, and as the effects of CC will likely continue. Iran is arguably on the right path in forming constructive regional water sharing institutions with its neighbours, however, this spirit of co-operation will need to be deepened to avoid rising points of conflict not only with the Kurdish people in Iranian territory and those seeking independence in Iraq, but with Afghanistan and Turkey too. Such co-operation is in the interest of all in the region to insure stability and leadership in an uncertain future.