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WATER POLITICS

Via Modern Diplomacy, an article on how water scarcity, exacerbated by climate change, is posing a serious threat to global “hotspots” with Iran among the most vulnerable:

Water scarcity, exacerbated by climate change, is posing a serious threat to global “hotspots” with Iran among the most vulnerable. Iran is swiftly approaching a state of “water bankruptcy,” marked by a perilous imbalance where water demand surpasses the available natural supply.

The relentless depletion of non-renewable water resources has triggered a cascade of environmental and socio-economic challenges nationwide. This deepening crisis is poised to disrupt livelihoods, worsen food insecurity, negatively impact water-dependent industries and services, drive migration decisions, and intensify social tensions.

Iran is bracing for another summer of blistering heat, which threatens not only to push the boundaries of human endurance but to exacerbate the country’s water crisis and spark a fresh wave of protests across the country.

Iran’s “Water Bankruptcy”

While the concept of “bankruptcy” is typically associated with legal matters, it aptly characterizes Iran’s current water situation, where water withdrawals far outpace the natural recharge capacity of aquifers, rivers, and lakes.

Iran has long grappled with water scarcity, but the situation is rapidly deteriorating. The 2024 United Nations World Water Development Report, titled “Water for Prosperity and Peace,” listed Iran as one of the countries experiencing “extremely high water stress,” using over 80% of its annual renewable freshwater supply.

As a water-stressed nation, Iran’s usage of water resources surpasses their natural replenishment rate. According to World Bank data, Iran’s renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (internal river flows and groundwater from rainfall) have been declining for decades. A growing population in Iran has contributed to a decrease in renewable water resources, further worsening water scarcity.

The country’s surface water in rivers, lakes, wetlands, and reservoirs is dwindling at a rapid pace. Iran’s reservoirs have reached dangerously low water levels. Wetlands and lakes in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchistan, for example, have dried up. The Hamun wetlands were a key source of food and livelihood for thousands of people. But as the wetlands have diminished, many locals have migrated to the cities.

The depletion of water resources in Iran results from a complex interplay of factors, including recurrent meteorological droughts, high climatic variability, and human activities, notably population growth driving increased demand, inefficient agricultural water utilization, and unsustainable management of water resources.

Climate change-induced low precipitation levels have worsened Iran’s water scarcity in recent years. A recent study by the World Weather Attribution (WAA) project reported that substantial portions of Iran endured extreme and exceptional agricultural drought conditions spanning the 36 months leading up to June 2023. This drought has persisted since then. In the past year ending on March 19, rainfall in the country decreased by 26% and 16% compared to the long-term average and the preceding water year, respectively. Yet, Iran’s water crisis cannot solely be attributed to natural causes. The massive reduction in area of the country’s wetlands, for instance, is predominantly linked to cropland and urban land expansion.

Disastrous Mismanagement

Poor management of the country’s water resources is a longstanding problem. Land reforms introduced during the 1960s and 1970s included the development of the industrial sector in or near major urban areas and the building of giant facilities that largely ignored hydrological concerns.

Since the 1979 revolution, much of Iran’s accessible water has been allocated to ambitious agricultural development endeavors aimed at achieving food self-sufficiency, often disregarding natural constraints. Irrigated agriculture represents the largest consumer of water in Iran, accounting for 92% of usage, yet water efficiency remains alarmingly low, with agricultural water productivity ranking among the lowest in the region.

Iran’s post-revolutionary clerical regime has promoted unsustainable agricultural practices, including the expansion of water-intensive crops like wheat, rice, and sugar beet, as well as the cultivation of agricultural products in desert areas. The government has also authorized numerous river diversion schemes not only to meet the water demands of heavy industries but to accommodate the expansion of agricultural activities fueled by rapid population growth, along with restricted opportunities for new employment and business ventures.

The excessive exploitation of groundwater and surface water, driven by poorly planned dam and hydraulic constructions, as well as water transfer schemes, has disrupted natural water flows. This disruption has led to the desiccation of local water bodies, depletion of groundwater reserves, and even land subsidence. Unrestrained water extraction and water-intensive agricultural techniques have endangered vast areas of the country, particularly peripheral regions such as Khuzestan, where a sizable Arab minority resides.

The worsening of the country’s water crisis is no secret to Iranian officials. As Iran sweltered under temperatures soaring to 50°C in June 2021, Ahad Vazifeh, a senior weather forecaster at the National Meteorology Organization (IRIMO), delivered a stark message: “Bluntly speaking, there is no water.” Against the backdrop of protests that summer over water shortages in the country’s drought-stricken southwest, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself conceded: “The people showed their displeasure … but we cannot really blame the people and their issues must be taken care of.”

Iranian officials have acknowledged not just the scale of the water crisis but also the shortcomings of their own actions in addressing it. In 2018, referring to the folly of Iran’s relentless dam-building, Issa Kalantari, then head of the country’s Environment Department and a former Minister of Agriculture, admitted: “We made these mistakes in the 1980s … We came to realize that we built dams where they were unnecessary and neglected to build them where they were essential.” In October 2023, the Majlis Research Center, the parliament’s research arm, underscored that mismanagement has played a significant role in worsening the water crisis. The Center also warned that the current approach, which aims for self-sufficiency in food production for the Iranian population, lacks the requisite water resources to support this objective. Yet, despite growing awareness of the environmental repercussions of dam construction, policymakers appear to have continued to favor ideology over science and/or succumbed to corrupt practices.

Legitimacy, Stability, and the Politics of Water

Iran’s water crisis is inextricably linked to its politics. This is evident in Iran’s subsidy policies, a problematic legacy of the 1979 revolution, which was carried out in the name of “the oppressed.” The Islamic Republic has remained committed to a welfare state ideology centered on “social justice” ever since. Initially introduced to alleviate the difficulties of the eight-year war with Iraq, subsidies have been maintained to counteract political and economic challenges.

Iran, recognized as one of the highest water consumers per capita, heavily subsidizes water consumption for its citizens. These subsidies have aimed at helping rural farmers, who account for nearly a quarter of the country’s workforce and constitute a bedrock of political support for the regime. However, subsidy policies have perpetuated the overuse of water resources. Moreover, as reported, between 2015 and 2022 a quarter of Iran’s farmers lost their jobs, mostly due to lack of water.

Besides the mounting fiscal costs of subsidies, a large portion of the state budget is directed towards various water management schemes. The principal financial beneficiaries of such schemes are regime “insiders,” most notably entities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the so-called “water mafia.” Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), the principal engineering and construction entity under IRGC control and one of Iran’s largest economic conglomerates, has served as a primary contractor for major civil and military projects, including the construction of dams and water diversion schemes. Thus, financial gain and political influence have come at the expense of environmental wellbeing.

Amid worsening water scarcity, disastrous mismanagement, and corruption, the rise in public discontent comes as no surprise. Access to water has emerged as a common cause, transcending societal boundaries and ethnic backgrounds. The shortages have spurred individuals, including those typically less inclined to protest, to take to the streets to voice their frustrations, a sentiment shared even by those benefiting from government subsidies and aid.

Between September and November 2018, farmers from Isfahan province staged a 40-day protest against local officials’ mismanagement of scarce water supplies. In November of 2021, water shortages in the southwest sparked demonstrations that spread to the capital and other regions. A year ago in August, Sistan-Baluchistan Province, especially its northern cities, which have been enduring a water crisis, witnessed water protests.

Iran’s water crisis represents not only a complex domestic challenge but also a transboundary issue that has complicated the country’s relationships with its neighbors. Iran is embroiled in water rights conflicts with Afghanistan, Iraq, and Turkey, which have evolved into intense disputes. Central to these disputes are disagreements over the construction of major dams to manage water flows and usage.

Afghanistan controls upriver water sources that feed low-lying wetlands and lakes in Iran’s southeast. According to a 1973 treaty, Afghanistan is committed to sharing water from the Helmand River with Iran. Yet, the agreement also allows for reduced water deliveries during periods of low water levels, which have been aggravated by persistent drought and the construction of new dams in Afghanistan. Yet, the accord also allows for decreased water delivery during times of low water levels, which have been worsened by persistent drought and the construction of new dams in Afghanistan. Particularly significant is the completion of the Kamal Khan Dam on the Helmand River in 2021, shortly before the Taliban assumed power in Kabul, further complicating matters.

Meanwhile, Iran’s unabated dam construction campaign to generate reserves for household and industrial use and to push industrial development has had the effect of limiting the outflow from the Arvand, Karkheh, and Karun rivers into Iraq, which has substantially aggravated the water scarcity crisis in southern Iraq. Similarly, Iran’s obstruction of significant water supplies originating from the Zagros Mountains have threatened the livelihoods for nearly two million of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), making the situation critical for the inhabitants.

The management of transboundary water resources has also become a contentious issue in Iran-Turkey relations, as they share five rivers but lack a bilateral water cooperation treaty, unlike between Iran and Afghanistan. Iranian officials have voiced concerns about Turkey’s major dam projects on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, considering them “dangerous” for the entire region. They have attributed Iraq’s water troubles to Turkey and have accused Ankara’s water policy of contributing to the dust storms that affect both Iraq and Iran. And they have raised specific objections against dam constructions on the Aras River, which flows eastward along the Iran-Armenia and Armenia-Azerbaijan borders, ultimately reaching the Caspian Sea.

Sporadic attempts at water diplomacy have yielded little progress towards resolving any of these disputes. Nevertheless, even if proactive, sustained diplomatic efforts were to succeed, they would not be sufficient on their own to rescue Iran from its water crisis.

Conclusion

Iran is suffering from an acute water crisis. Iranian officials cite climate extremes and international sanctions as the main culprits behind the country’s water crisis. However, Dr. Kaveh Madani, Director of the UNU Institute for Water, Environment and Health and a leading authority on Iran’s water issues, offers a different perspective. In a 2014 article, Madani contended that these exogenous factors are “only crisis catalyzers, not the main cause of the water crisis.” He attributed the crisis instead to a water management paradigm characterized by “uncoordinated development” and a focus on immediate economic gains. Despite the passage of a decade since his publication, there has been no indication of a shift in this paradigm.

The persistent and largely ineffective paradigmatic approach — marked by short-term, reactive measures — is clearly seen in Khuzestan, where water scarcity sparked protests in mid-2021, reflecting the socio-economic and environmental pressures in this province that mirror those confronting the nation as a whole. Mehdi Ketabchy, a water engineering consultant and researcher, astutely observed in a 2021 article that Iran’s water management approach is symptomatic of broader governance issues, including ideological policymaking, centralized decision-making, preference for quick-fix solutions, and conflicts of interest. He believes that “a systematic transition towards democratic, decentralized, non-ideological, and economically diverse political governance” is imperative for tackling Iran’s water resources bankruptcy problem.

The regime’s failure to address the country’s water challenges effectively not only threatens its legitimacy further but also increases tensions with neighboring states, especially those sharing interconnected river basins. Additionally, it risks perpetuating cycles of civil unrest and repression, fueling mass migration and localized violence, and intensifying competition for resources within shared river basins. Without a fundamental paradigm shift that prioritizes proactive management of water resources and fosters broad citizen and stakeholder engagement, the risks and costs will continue to accumulate and escalate.

Yet, as hardline clerics continue to push for a full-scale resistance economy while moderates strive for greater economic integration into the global system, the Iranian people are running out of patience, marginalized communities are running out of options, and Iran is running out of water.