BLOG
July 1st, 2014
Via Future Directions’ Food and Water Security Study, an interesting focus on the potential for conflict over shared water resources:
For decades, commentators have been predicting the advent of “water wars” as the essential resource is depleted in some regions. These predictions are yet to eventuate and the overwhelming experience of interstate water-sharing is one of nominal cooperation. The threat of conflict over transboundary water resources is likely to increase in the future though as demand increases and countries compete for resources and test existing water sharing arrangements. While there has been minimal conflict thus far, the extent of cooperation has been overstated. Numerous water treaties exist, but most lack enforceable mechanisms or active collaboration on the long term management of resources. Severe water scarcity will put these treaties to the test.
The chief transboundary water bodies that could be subject to conflict are river basins and shared aquifers. Conflict over transboundary river basins can emerge from a number of sources as upstream states undertake actions that reduce the quality or quantity of downstream flows. These can include pollution of water ways, water diversions projects, or the construction of hydropower dams that reduce downstream flow or block fish migration paths or silt loads.
River systems that may prove a source of dispute in coming decades are the: the Nile, Euphrates, and Niger, and a number of the Himalayan river systems including the Tigris, Mekong, Ganges/Brahmaputra and Jamuna rivers.
Transboundary water disputes can also occur within states. India has weak water sharing arrangements for its river systems and its states often come into conflict over water allocations. Much of the degradation of Indian river systems has been attributed to a failure of the states to cooperatively manage shared water resources.
UNESCO estimate that 97 per cent of the world’s available freshwater is stored underground, making it the most important available source of water for human use. The majority of the world’s surface freshwater sources are over-allocated; as demand grows and competing interests for surface water limit availability, the rights and access to subterranean aquifers, when shared between two or more states, could lead to inter- and intra- state conflict.
There are more than 400 transboundary aquifers globally according to the International Groundwater Research Resources Assessment Centre (IGRAC). Of these only four have an interstate agreement for cooperation. The over-abstraction of groundwater is creating increased stress on aquifers worldwide, compromising their water quality and sustainability. Despite the critical state of many, aquifers are less likely to lead to conflict than transboundary river basins because of the difficulty involved in monitoring and evaluating water extraction and aquifer health. It is difficult to ascertain how much water individual states and users are extracting, thus making it hard to pinpoint the overuse which could be a source of conflict.
The Nile Basin
The Nile is a highly contentious body of water as it is the only major reliable source of renewable water for many of its littoral states. The eleven countries of the Nile Basin have a combined population of 450 million; this is expected to double by 2050. Many of the Nile’s littoral states already experience a moderate to high degree of food or water insecurity.
The Nile has the potential to be a major source of conflict between now and 2050, particularly given the river’s importance to Egypt. Egypt is heavily reliant on the Nile for its national livelihood; 97 per cent of the country’s water supply originates from the river. Egypt already overdraws its allocation and suffers from diminished water quality because of overuse and poor water management. The country is unable to support an agricultural sector capable of feeding its population and relies on imports for over 70 per cent of its food supply. As food demand grows, Egypt will need more water; however, shifting geopolitical power structures mean that its allocation is likely to decrease as demand from upstream neighbours grows. Egypt views the Nile as a key strategic priority; it has been vocal and aggressive in its defence of its entitlement in the past. It regards its allocation as an incontrovertible ‘historic right.’
Resource tensions have come to a head in recent years over Ethiopia’s decision to construct Africa’s largest hydropower project, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, on the Blue Nile, one of the two major tributaries. Egypt views the construction of the dam as a threat to national security, claiming it will require the diversion of 18 billion cubic metres of water and lead to higher evaporation, leaving it severely short of water in the future. Despite the release of the international impact assessment for the project confirming the dam will not significantly impact Egypt or Sudan, Egypt continues to voice objections to the dam. In a mistakenly televised ministerial meeting in June 2013, members of parliament were heard discussing methods of ‘absorbing the shock’ of the Renaissance Dam, including supporting proxy military groups within Ethiopia to destabilise the government. The temporary diversion of water flows in May to allow the next phase of the dam’s construction, prompted former Egyptian President Morsi to declare that; “If our share of Nile water decreases, our blood will be the alternative.’ Egypt’s aggressive rhetoric indicated the degree of the Nile’s importance; however, in reality, Egypt lacks the capability to act on its threats. Military analysts have highlighted the operational difficulties involved in an attack on the dam and the country lacks the internal stability or economic capacity to support military action. The incendiary comments are best understood as a “last ditch” attempt to maintain a hegemonic stance on the Nile that is bound to fail. While under current circumstance, military conflict is unlikely, the area remains one of high risk for international water disputes in the future.
The Himalayan River Systems
The Himalayan region is fast emerging as the most likely arena for transboundary water disputes and competition in the world. Located on average 4,500 meters above sea level, the Tibetan Plateau in the Himalayan Region is the largest repository of fresh water in the world after the Arctic and Antarctic. Located between India and China, and a source for a number of the world’s greatest river systems, the plateau supports close to half the world’s population in its watershed. China, driven by severe water shortages and polluted water systems, has begun to harness the water capacity of the plateau and divert water to the state’s industrial and densely populated north-east. The only state with no institutionalised water sharing agreement, China continues to plan hydroelectric dams and diversions with little transparency toward riparian states. This has led to increased tensions with downstream states, reliant on the Tibetan Plateau as a means of livelihood, food and water security. Upstream dams under construction on the Yarlung Tsangpo River have raised concerns for Bangladesh and India, who are reliant on the river’s run to feed the Brahmaputra. Building dams upstream will have a significant impact on the availability of fresh water to supply north-Eastern India and Bangladesh.
Besides India and Bangladesh, water originating from the Tibetan Plateau is a source for rivers in Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, Cambodia, Pakistan, Lao, Thailand and Vietnam. Any diversion or damming upstream will negatively affect downstream riparian states. China controls the source of many of the major rivers running through these states and as such is strategically placed to control a large percentage of available water in the region. As water scarcity and degradation rises in many of these states, tensions over water allocations and control will grow.
Experts predict in the next 20 years the Himalayas may become the most dammed region in the world. The ecological, social and political impact this will have on South and South-east Asia has barely been examined, yet planning and development continues at increasing speed. A water race between states is emerging, predominantly between China and India, with the goal to dam and develop as much of the Himalayan water system as quickly as possible. Water security, particularly for downstream states will become more precarious as Chinese strategy continues to focus on national interest and economic development over ecological values and the protection of flows to riparian states.