BLOG
April 12th, 2018
Via Future Directions International, a close look at Iran’s water related tensions:
From 28 December 2017 to 7 January 2018, protests broke out in a number of Iranian cities. The protests first started in Mashhad and were probably sparked by the theocratic regime’s total mismanagement of the economy, its political corruption and the country’s foreign policy. Whereas the 2009 “Green Revolution” was centred on the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the recent protests were largely to do with food price inflation, deteriorating living conditions and apparent faults in the Islamic system directing the country.
On 7 January, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) declared that the protests had been crushed. Online, however, signs of protest remain. As has been covered elsewhere, food and water insecurity played a part in the 2017/2018 protests. It seems that those same insecurities are continuing to contribute to protests across the country.
Comment
The centrally-located Isfahan province has recently been the site of further protests, which have turned increasingly violent over the last few months. Farmers have been rallying against the diversion of water from the Zayandehrood River (the province’s main river) to neighbouring regions.
Around 29 December last year, protests in Isfahan gathered momentum when farmers took to the streets to protest government and IRGC-owned companies stealing water from river supplies used by the farmers. The supposed suppression of these protests seems to have failed somewhat. Unrest was seen to be stirring again in early March, when it was reported that protesters in Isfahan had again clashed with security forces. Farmers, marching in their thousands, apparently intended to destroy a transfer pipeline that was being used to take water from the Zayandehrood in Isfahan to the neighbouring Yazd province. Isfahan province is mainly populated by people working in the agricultural industry. On 8 April, it was reported that farmers, inspired by the protests held in early March, had again organised a rally protesting government corruption and blatant water theft.
Water insecurity cannot alone explain how the protests arose and why they have caused considerable harm to the regime’s legitimacy. Official financial corruption has also eroded national water security, especially for farmers. One of the culprits, if not the worst culprit, has been the IRGC. Since the 1979 revolution, the IRGC has been granted a considerable stake in the running of the economy, resulting in significant resource diversions and corruption. Around 600 dam projects have been completed, with many of them being built by IRGC-owned construction companies, allowing water to be transferred to the people and/or projects that suit Corp interests.
Government corruption has been compounded by uncertainties in the banking sector, which are adding further fuel to the protests. The Washington Institute writes that for Iranian business to thrive there must be a well-managed relationship between the banks and businesses, a relationship that does not exist at present. The IRGC takes money out of the accounts of depositors and puts it in Corp accounts outside the official banking system. Iran does not have deposit insurance, which means the Central Bank (CB) has to repay depositors the money that was stolen from them. Because the CB has no way to recover this money, it is extremely vulnerable to collapse. Social media sites abound with people, in Isfahan, chanting anti-regime slogans and denouncing Hassan Rouhani and the IRGC as responsible for causing the economic ruin of ordinary Iranians.
This kind of activity, coupled with the rapid decrease in the value of the Iranian currency, has generated considerable outrage among investors and borrowers. It has also further exposed the country to both internal and external shocks. Interestingly, there has been little restraint on the part of the protestors in blaming the government, the IRGC and the clerical establishment for the decline in living standards and the depletion of a number of savings accounts.
Water insecurity, among many other grievances, such as financial insecurity, has become a more powerful challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. In 2017, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in his annual Nowruz speech, focused on how the country’s economy has “prospered” under the mullahs. The state of the economy was clearly on his mind and the protests that emerged later on that year stood as a refutation of the Supreme Leader’s preferred reality. This year, Khamenei’s speech arguably overdid it, by not only citing the “economic prowess” of the country, but also the regime’s efforts to safeguard “social justice” and “democracy”.
Though it is difficult to assess how secure the regime feels, there can be no doubt that recent protests, inspired by water and financial insecurities, are causing those in power to question their own legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The Supreme Leader’s assertions do not fit the economic realities facing Iran and his insistence on them has led many to believe that the leadership is shirking its responsibility to the Iranian people.