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As we have discussed previously and as recently noted by WaterWired, there are a number of difficult issues faced by the countries in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya basins, the two major streams in the region.
As the article notes:
“…the aforementioned streams both terminate in the Aral Sea, and the diversion of these rivers for agriculture (food and cotton) during the Soviet area initiated the extreme desiccation of the Aral Sea. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan use most of the diverted water for irrigation; the latter is the world’s #2 cotton exporter.
In a nutshell, Tajikistan wants to develop hydropower on the Vakhsh River, a major tributary of the Amu Darya. 80% of the water in Amu Darya basin is derived from Tajikistan, and 8% from Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, and to some degree, Turkmenistan, are worried that Tajikistan will hold up much of the summer flow behind dams so that it can generate much-needed electricity in the winter. That would cut down on the available irrigation for food and cotton during the summer. Tajikistan says it won’t do that. Hmmm….
Another issue is the power itself. Uzbekistan sells power to Tajikistan, and that market would diminish. But Tajikistan wants to sell its excess power to privide income, and that would have to go through Uzbekistan, meaning the Uzbeks would again have leverage. So Tajikistan wants to partner with Kyrgyzstan, which wants to develop more hydropower and irrigation on the Syr Darya, to which it contributes 74% of the flow, and build a north-south power corridor that would avoid Uzbekistan. Naturally the Uzbeks are further annoyed by all this. At one point they even threatened military action against Kyrgyzstan over a dam and reservoir on the Syr Darya.
Another unknown in this mix is Afghanistan, which, because of internal turmoil, is not much involved in Central Asian water issues. But should some measure of stability occur, it will want to develop the Amu Darya for irrigation and perhaps hydropower. So the plot will thicken…”